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Although theoretically contentious, most empirical studies contend that electoral-political
factors structure the welfare state. In practice, most studies concentrate on ‘government
partisanship’, that is the ideological character of the government. We agree that politics
matters but also seek to expand our understanding of what ‘politics’ should be taken to mean.
Drawing on recent comparative research on agenda-setting, we study the impact of whether
welfare state issues were broadly salient in the public sphere during the election campaign that
produced the government. We formulate hypotheses about how such systemic campaign
salience and government partisanship (separately and interactively) affect welfare generosity.
We also consider how such effects might have changed, taking into account challenges to
standard assumptions of representative democracy coming from the ‘new politics of the
welfare state’ framework. We combine well-known, but updated, data on welfare state
generosity and government partisanship, with original contextual data on campaign salience
from 16 West European countries for the years 1980–2008. We ﬁnd that campaigns matter
but also that their impact has changed. During the ﬁrst half of the examined period (the 1980s
and early 1990s), it mainly served to facilitate government partisanship effects on the welfare
state. More recently, big-time campaign attention to welfare state issues results in some
retrenchment (almost) regardless of who forms the postelection government. This raises
concerns about the democratic status of the politics of welfare state reform in Europe.
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Introduction
Questions about whether and how ‘politics matters’ have long been important in
comparative welfare state research. Perhaps the most researched political factor con-
cerns ‘government partisanship’, typically measured by the relative distribution of
cabinet posts among different party families. For example, the inﬂuential ‘power
resources model’ (see Korpi, 1983) links redistributive policies to the organizational
and political strength of the working class, often indicated by government
participation by leftist parties. Likewise, the ‘worlds of welfare’ approach launched by
Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests that the historical composition of governments, and
the class coalitions they reﬂect, help explain how countries that were initially similar in
welfare ambitions gradually came to resemble qualitatively different ‘welfare regimes’.
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We agree (and ﬁnd) that elections and ‘politics’matter, but we seek to broaden the
view of just exactly what these labels should be taken to mean. Democratic elections,
after all, entail more than an aggregation of exogenous and stable actor preferences
(e.g. Warren, 1992). They also entail a partly unpredictable pre-election discursive
phase in which relevant facts are exchanged, preferences weighted and potentially
reshaped (e.g. Schmidt, 2002). This is a broad remark, of course, one that opens up
questions concerning a host of discourse-oriented concepts, including ‘deliberation’
(Elster, 1998), ‘framing’ (Iyengar, 1991; Chong andDruckman, 2007), or ‘narratives’
(Boswell, 2012). However, we concentrate on the older, more basic, but potentially
powerful concept of agenda-setting. Drawing on recent comparative research on
agenda-setting, we analyze the importance of whether welfare state issues were
broadly salient in the public sphere during the election campaign that resulted in a
particular distribution of ‘government partisanship’. Such broad systemic election
campaign agendas, we argue, contribute to our understanding of policy dynamics, a
topic that has gained currency (e.g. Häusermann, 2010; Palier, 2010; Hemerijck,
2013). We formulate hypotheses about how both systemic salience and government
partisanship (separately and interactively) play a role. We also consider how such
effects might themselves have changed, taking into account challenges to standard
assumptions of representative democracy coming from Pierson’s (1996, 2001) ‘new
politics of the welfare state’ (NPWS) framework.
Our dependent variable is the well-known, but now updated, welfare generosity
measure provided by Scruggs et al. (2013). On the independent side, we combine a
standard measure of government partisanship with original data on systemic
campaign salience of the broad welfare state domain. We ﬁnd that ‘campaigns
matter’ but also that their impact has changed. During the ﬁrst half of the examined
period (the 1980s and early 1990s), it mainly served to facilitate government
partisanship effects on the welfare state; as we will explain, this positive interaction
is consistent with standard assumptions of ‘mandate-oriented’ representative
democracy. More recently, campaign salience ceases to enable ideological effects on
policy. This is partly consistent with the NPWS framework, which predicts centrist
tendencies around cautious reform and retrenchment policies, as welfare states go
deeper into the ‘era of permanent austerity’. In fact, we even ﬁnd mild support for
the bold ‘Nixon goes to China’ prediction of somewhatmore retrenchment by leftist
governments when welfare issues are salient in recent years. Presumably, this could
be because such governments can more credibly cut costs and enhance ﬁnancial
sustainability without being ‘accused’ of neo-liberalism (Ross, 2000a).
Now, the Nixon pattern is not exceedingly strong, with predicted non-retrenchment
in times of salience only among really rightist governments. Thus, the main takeaway
for the later period might rather be stated as follows: major salience of welfare state
issues in European election campaigns now results in some retrenchment (almost)
regardless of who forms the postelection government. This is certainly not anticipated
by a mandate view of representative democracy. It is also potentially inconsistent with
NPWS, which implies more retrenchment whenwelfare state issues are absent from the
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public’s radar (i.e. when ‘blame avoidance’ opportunities are, all things equal, greater).
As the concluding section will discuss, however, the exact interpretation is open to
future debate and will depend on analyses and data of a kind that is currently
unavailable. The concluding section, moreover, raises concerns about the democratic
status of the politics of welfare state reform in Europe.
Controversies over government partisanship and the welfare state
Although intuitively plausible, the ‘politics matters’ thesis has always been
controversial. Early debates fed off an alleged ‘functionalist’ contention that welfare
states grow generally with modernization and afﬂuence (e.g. Wilensky, 1975). Later,
‘race to the bottom’ scenarios forecasted that economic globalization forces
governments fromwhatever ideological camp to attract mobile tax bases, with adverse
effects for social protection (Swank, 2002).
These debates have lost some momentum. In part, this is because the government
partisanship hypothesis continued, at least for a long time, to receive empirical
support in explaining policy levels and change (van Kersbergen, 1995; Huber
and Stephens, 2001; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Castles,
2007). Thus, Schmidt (2010: 213) concludes in a fairly recent overview
that ‘Although conceding the multi-causal determination of all policy outcomes
[…] the evidence of a wide variety of studies is that the “parties matter” hypothesis
passes the empirical test reasonably well’. At the same time, the success of
partisan theory depends on the sample of countries. Samples mixing Europe
with Anglo-Saxon welfare states tend to yield clearer and more signiﬁcant
differences. By contrast, samples of only European countries throw up
weaker, more variable, and less signiﬁcant results. A main reason is that European
samples limit the variation in the independent variable. As Schmidt (2010: 216)
explains, ‘strong pro welfare state parties […] have been the major parties in
power in Western Europe. In contrast, the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan are countries in which non-leftist parties and, above all, market-oriented
conservative parties have played a far more important role in shaping the timing
and substance of public policy’. So using only European data – as we do here – is
likely to yield conservative estimates of partisanship effects. We will return to this in
view of our ﬁndings.
The most persistent challenge to partisan theory now comes from Pierson’s
(1996, 2001) notion of a ‘new politics of the welfare state’ (Green-Pedersen
and Haverland, 2002; Levy, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013). Mainstream parties and
governments, the argument goes, increasingly ﬁnd their hands tied to a cautious
reform agenda by the popularity of the welfare state on the one hand, and a
perceived reform need prompted by economic and demographic change on the
other. A number of gradually deepening ‘reform pressures’ contribute to an
environment of ‘permanent austerity’ beginning, according to most
scholars, sometime in the early 1980s (Pierson, 2001; Hay and Wincott, 2012).
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Prominent reform pressures include high dependency ratios – arising from
population ageing, poor fertility, low employment rates (or even welfare abuse) –
but also intensiﬁed international economic and ﬁnancial mobility. The latter
create real or perceived obstacles to simply meeting greater welfare needs with
raised taxation. In the era of permanent austerity, then, it has gradually
become more difﬁcult to ﬁnance previous policy commitments. However,
institutional inertia coupled with strong welfare state support and risk aversion
among citizens blocks radical reform. As governments of all denominations are
caught between a rock and a hard place, Pierson predicts (2001: 417) increasingly
centrist tendencies in the era of austerity: ‘neither the alternatives of standing
pat or dismantling are likely to prove viable in most countries. Instead […] we
should expect strong pressures to move towards more centrist – and therefore more
incremental – responses. Those seeking to generate signiﬁcant cost reductions
while modernizing particular aspects of social provision will generally hold
the balance of political power’. Examining a host of dependent variables,
recent research ﬁnds support for this idea of declining partisan effects in the
austerity era (Stephens, 2015).
Radical retrenchment is still possible under NPWS theory but mainly when
concealed from the watching eye of the electorate through ‘blame avoidance’
strategies. As originally discussed by Weaver (1986), policymakers can use many
blame avoidance strategies (see also Hood, 2007). Some are ‘institutional’ where
actors may strategically equip several political levels with overlapping
and confusing responsibilities. Others are ‘policy-related’ relying on low-key
non-decisions, opaque policies, or strategically delayed policy effects. ‘Presenta-
tional’ blame avoidance strategies, ﬁnally, concern our topic, that is public com-
munication. Here, actors can ﬁrst try to keep a problematic area off the agenda
altogether. If impossible, actors can claim that others are in reality to blame, or
claim that ‘we had no choice’. The most common version of the latter is probably
the argument that exceedingly strong and immediate reform pressure, for example
an economic crisis, with high unemployment-related budgetary strains, coupled
with galloping debt and poor credit ratings, necessitates policies that neither citizens
nor decision makers really prefer (Starke, 2008).
All things equal, blame for retrenchment should be harder for any government to
avoid, when welfare state issues are broadly salient in an election campaign. Still,
there may be partisan differences in just how constraining such attention is. Ross
(2000a) has discussed a ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic where leftist governments may
end up retrenching and restructuring the welfare state just as much, or even more,
because of issue ownership and perceived trustworthiness in most welfare state
areas. Thus, even in public they can more credibly adopt the centrist and pragmatic
reform stance identiﬁed as crucial by NPWS theory in the austerity era. This
argumentation is a more difﬁcult sell for right-leaning governments as these
can often be accused of actually wanting retrenchment for deeper ideological
‘neo-liberal’ reasons.
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Systemic agenda-setting and comparative welfare state research
At present, research on government partisanship tends to follow two paths. One line
of inquiry reﬁnes dependent variables, moving beyond encompassing measures of
the welfare state. Examples include dimensions of active labour market policy
(Nelson, 2013), types of public sector market reforms (Gingrich, 2011), and human
capital creation (Iversen and Stephens, 2008). The other line of development
involves an interactive approach. Promising new research suggests partisan effects
seem partly dependent on structural and institutional factors related to ‘veto points’
(Starke, 2008), the nature of the party system (Green-Pedersen, 2001), and the
‘quality of government’, that is impartiality and absence of corruption in the legal
and bureaucratic system (Rothstein et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2013). We continue
down this second path. However, we do not concentrate on structural-institutional
variation but rather on volatile contextual conditions, in particular how election
campaign agendas enable or mute partisan effects.
Comparative welfare state research has generally been more preoccupied with policy
preferences than with policy agendas. Much energy – and rightly so – has been devoted
to studying which types of policies enjoy support in different groups of citizens, political
parties, and organized interests. Less scrutinized are questions about where welfare
preferences rank in priority on the political agenda, that is the extent to which they are
prioritized and paid attention to at various stages of the policy process. This imbalance
may have evolved for good reason but is not entirely satisfactory at this point. Agenda-
setting represents a more dynamic element in democratic politics than preferences,
which are often largely stable over longer periods of time. In a seminal study, Kingdon
[(2011) [1984]] conceived of agenda-setting as the result of complex interactions
between several largely independent ‘streams’ of events. This model goes beyond simple
‘real-world’ indicators of reform pressures (which have little impact taken on their own,
seeDearing andRogers, 1996), and include shifting interpretations of societal problems,
political events such as election results and opinion changes, and ﬁnally the values,
interests, and menu of possible policy tools that actors bring to the process at a given
point in time. According to Kingdon, these ‘streams’ need to coincide benevolently in
order for particular issues to climb the agenda. The process cannot be controlled entirely
by any single actor and the underlying interactions between streams are in part sys-
tematic and reoccurring but also partly unpredictable. Moreover, as already Downs
(1972: 38–39) argued, ‘a systematic “issue-attention cycle” seems strongly to inﬂuence
public attitudes and behavior concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these
problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then—
though still largely unresolved—gradually fades from the center of public attention’.
Relatedly, recent research informed by the theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ shows
that while agendas usually display little change from one year to another change cer-
tainly does occur. And when it does it is characterized by short-term outbursts of
attention (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Yet other agenda shifts are likely to be more long
term. A couple of studies indicate that the political systems in Western welfare states
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have given more collective attention to (some) welfare state issues during the last few
decades, albeit with much short-term ﬂuctuations (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson,
2008; Kumlin et al., 2012). Overall, then, these accounts suggest a volatile, if not ran-
dom, view of agenda-setting. Big agenda shifts in the political process are possible even if
basic ideological conﬂict over the welfare state (i.e. ‘government partisanship’) remains
stable. Thus, a full understanding of how ‘politics matters’ more broadly will be
incomplete if measures of agendas and issue priorities are not part of our analyses. Such
an omission, it may be added, becomes especially unfortunate given that welfare state
scholars are now increasingly concerned with rapid and sometimes unexpected policy
change (Häusermann, 2010; Palier, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013).
To be fair, bringing agenda-setting into comparative welfare state research has
been hard due to the non-comparative orientation of much political communication
scholarship (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975; De Vreese, 2003; Strömbäck and
Aalberg, 2008). Communication scholars have often modeled agenda-setting
as a within-system micro game. By example, models of ‘issue competition’
(e.g. Robertson, 1976; Carmines and Stimson, 1990) and ‘issue ownership’
(e.g. Petrocik, 1996) envision a struggle for the agenda in which parties try to make
citizens, other parties, and the media attend to policy areas where they themselves
are most positively evaluated. Within-system complexity has typically led scholars
to favor research designs in which a single process, issue, country, election is
studied. While this approach has been valuable it can obscure broader
cross-national and historical processes and differences. Hence, we know less
about whether agendas may also be fruitfully thought of as an overall contextual/
systemic characteristic of an entire political system. Is there a measurable and
consequential ‘overall essence’ of the agenda that transcends many actors and
groups in a place and point in time? Put differently, which small set of issues
manages to rise above the cacophony of multiple agendas so as to form a contextual
overall agenda?
Comparative politics scholars have recently begun to ask such questions (Baumgartner
et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). An interesting observation is that overall systemic/contextual
agenda shifts within a country may be frequently larger than differences between actors
at one point in time (Sigelman, 2004; Baumgartner et al., 2011). This has led to new
concepts such as ‘issue convergence’ or ‘issue overlap’ (Damore, 2005).
In sum scholars have taken steps towards a broader historical and comparative study
of agenda-setting. This paper continues this emerging research program in that we
conceptualize agenda-setting as a contextual phenomenon that varies across countries
and years, bringing novel information on such agendas into standard models of gov-
ernment partisanship. Election campaigns are interesting here not just because elections
affect policy, but also because they are shaped by a multitude of actors as well as
underlying real world events and trends. Exactly because campaigns involve many
competing inﬂuences that ‘mix’ during a short but crucial period, it becomes interesting
to consider which small set of issues become the more universally salient and debated
topics in that particular campaign.
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Hypotheses
Table 1 displays hypotheses about how government partisanship and systemic
campaign saliency of welfare state issues affect beneﬁt generosity. Speciﬁcally, the
ﬁrst column contains generic democratic expectations on the ability of aggregated
preferences and systemic agendas to affect public policy. These hypotheses conform
to something of a generic mandate-based representative democracy model
(Przeworski et al., 1999). Popular rule is secured as political parties present and
implement distinct programs about what problems deserve attention and what the
right policies are to address them. Citizens, on their part, are aware of party
differences and have sufﬁciently well-developed views of their own, such that they
can support the party offering the best match.
The second and third columns accommodate challenges posed by Pierson’s
‘new politics’ framework. Here, the generic democratic forces discussed above are
gradually accompanied by various centripetal mechanisms in the austerity era.
Speciﬁcally, the second column presents the NPWS framework in its pure form.
The third column, ﬁnally, teases out implications for how patterns might change
over time as welfare states move deeper into the austerity era. This third column –
which is what our empirics will test – allow the two logics to be inﬂuential at the
same time, while also recognizing that the balance might have shifted to the
advantage of NPWS in the last three decades.
In the top left cell of Table 1 is the original and previously discussed ‘politics
matters’ hypothesis, forecasting that more leftist governments expand more/
Table 1. How government partisanship and welfare state campaign salience affect
welfare generosity, according to different schools of thought
Mandate-oriented
representative
democracy in normal/
expansive times
‘New politics of the
welfare state’ (NPWS)
in era of permanent
austerity
Changes implied by NPWS
as austerity logic
increasingly supplements
logic of mandate-oriented
democracy
Government partisanship ‘Politics matters’:
(leftist governments
expand more/
retrench less)
‘End of ideology’ or even
‘Nixon goes to China’
(no or even reversed
effect of government
partisanship)
Weaker effect of
government partisanship
Campaign attention ‘Salience breeds
expansion’
‘Salience stalls
retrenchment’
Stable salience effect around
increasingly negative mean
Government partisanship
×
Campaign attention
‘Salience makes
politics matter’
Government
partisanship
matters more when
welfare state issues
have been salient
‘Salience mutes ideology’
or even ‘Salience makes
Nixon go to China’
(no or even reversed
effect of government
partisanship especially
likely with campaign
attention)
Weaker or even reversed
ability of campaign
salience to trigger
government partisanship
effects
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retrench less. Below that is the prediction that salience of a policy domain
will, especially under benevolent economic conditions, tend to produce government
expansion in that domain. For example, broad systemic agenda attention to
public transportation may, if resources exist, lead a government much of the
time, regardless of denomination, to spend more on roads and bridges. Here,
the ‘mandate’ that is perceived and acted upon by policymakers is purely
one of salience. Society’s resources are generally (re)directed towards the
areas currently prioritized and problematized by citizens and the public sphere.
Aside from democratic concerns, such an effect can also be understood
using the concept of attention scarcity. For cognitive, administrative, and
economic reasons, policymakers can only attend to some of the many
pressing problems. Policy changes tend to occur earlier and to a greater extent
in a rather small number of prioritized areas (see Kingdon, 2011 [1984];
Baumgartner et al., 2011).
Government partisanship and campaign attention may also interact positively in
a representative democracy, such that government partisanship effects on
welfare state generosity grow after election campaigns dominated by welfare
state issues. Two democratic mechanisms could be at play here. First, a mandate-
conﬁdence mechanism may make governments more conﬁdent to pursue
ideologically based policy in those areas that topped the overall agenda in
the election that put it into ofﬁce. Winning, or at least surviving, an election
combined with big-time attention to the area in question ensure that ‘policy-seeking’
and ‘ofﬁce seeking’ will seem in less conﬂict than usual in that area. This
would be important as it has been shown that welfare policies are also
generally affected by majority public preferences (e.g. Brooks and Manza, 2007;
Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). This mandate conﬁdence mechanism, if present
in the minds of policy makers, certainly has well-documented micro foundations.
Political behavior research has long demonstrated the importance of elite-level
politicization for individual-level issue salience (McCombs and Shaw, 1972;
Dearing and Rogers, 1996), issue voting (Stokes, 1963), interest-preference
coherence (Berelson et al., 1954; Kumlin and Svallfors, 2007), and internal value
coherence (Granberg and Holmberg, 1988). Overall, it seems warranted to
speak about a more coherent and strongly expressed policy mandate in areas
more salient at election time. Second, one may discern a mandate-accountability
mechanism. Parties give election pledges and ideological policy cues in a
large number of areas (e.g. Naurin, 2011). And while citizens do not always
monitor closely whether representatives implement their programs (e.g. Stokes,
2001), electoral sanctions, and politicians’ fear thereof, should be more widespread
in issue areas high on the agenda (Hutchings, 2003), because in these areas one may
expect a greater willingness and ability to monitor incumbents. Conversely, areas
that did not color the systemic campaign agenda may not be subject to such
perceived pressure because any signs of poor program realization will be less
noticeable, prioritized, and understood among citizens, media, and the opposition.
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The second column contains predictions emanating from theNPWS framework in its
pure form. The ﬁrst one suggests, to borrow from Bell (1960), an ‘end of ideology’ of
sorts. Governments of all ideological denominations must pursue a centrist, cautious
reform and retrenchment doctrine. They all must simultaneously address heavy reform
pressures while not aggravating a welfare state-supporting public. Pierson argues that
left-right related interests and values were certainly important in the expansion phase of
the welfare state, but that they lose explanatory clout in the austerity phase. Cautious
and centrist policy tendencies arise as all parties gradually ﬁnd themselves caught
between a rock (more or less severe reformpressures) and a hard place (enduringwelfare
state support with associated needs for blame avoidance). In fact, according to the
previously discussed ‘Nixon goes to China’ hypothesis, leftist governments might even
‘leapfrog’ rightist governments; the former can exploit their welfare state credibility and
issue ownership for cautious reform while the latter become paralyzed by feared
accusations of ideologically motivated retrenchment, which is assumed to be unpopular
under NPWS.
Moving one step down, the main effect of salience is still positively signed. But
whereas mandate democracy in economically expansive times would produce
outright expansion relative to the status quo, the expectation is rather that it stalls
retrenchment for the beneﬁt of the status quo. Under NPWS, retrenchment is
assumed to be unpopular but conceivable, for example if fewer voters, journalists,
and members of the opposition are debating the welfare state in public. This does
not mean it is impossible to engage in retrenchment and blame avoidance also when
the lights of the public sphere are turned on, for example by arguing that ‘we had no
choice’ or blame some other political actor or level. But all things equal it should be
easier to escape blame and implement unpopular reform when the political system
as a whole has had its attention directed elsewhere.
Finally, NPWS implies that the ability of campaign saliency to stimulate
partisanship effects on policy has decreased as welfare states have moved deeper
into the era of austerity. Actors become cautious and centrist, and especially so
when the lime light is turned on. In this era, the nature of welfare state discourse
should change so that problematic reform pressures will increasingly be part of the
debate (Ross, 2000b). This makes the advocacy of a reform agenda of some sort
increasingly hard to avoid for all actors compared to previously. At the same time,
campaign saliency should also increase the need for clever blame avoidance, as well
as the potential magnitude of electoral punishment if avoidance does not work
(Armingeon and Giger, 2008b). So in the austerity phase, then, saliency may push
all actors to the middle by, on the one hand, increasingly salient reform pressures
and, on the other, the enduring popularity of the welfare state with associated needs
for blame avoidance. Finally, any ‘Nixon goes to China’ mechanisms at work
should become more pronounced with broad-based system salience, since this
hypothesis relies on ownership and perceived credibility in a particular policy
domain. The constraints and opportunities afforded by the Nixon logic should
therefore be smaller if this domain is less salient.
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Data and measurement
In order to test these hypotheses we need, at minimum, measures of (1) the character
of the welfare state, (2) government partisanship, (3) systemic/contextual salience of
the welfare state in election campaigns, and (4) relevant control variables.
First, to measure the welfare state we use the overall beneﬁt generosity index
presented by Scruggs (2006).We use the recently released second version of the data
(Scruggs et al., 2013). The index, where high scores indicate more generous policies,
registers net income replacement rates, workforce coverage, length of qualifying
periods, and duration of beneﬁts in sickness beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts, and
pensions. As developed elsewhere (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs,
2004; Stephens, 2010), an index based on citizen rights to social insurance is often a
better way of measuring ‘the welfare state’ compared to expenditure-based
measures. Conceptually, we are interested in whether the individual is insured
from income loss, not governmental spending per se.
Second, as a measure of government partisanship we use the right party cabinet
portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government
was in ofﬁce in a given year from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al.,
2008). The classiﬁcation of parties was done according to Schmidt (1996) and includes
liberal and conservative parties, whereas Christian Democratic and Catholic parties are
not included.We use this variable as past research suggest that right parties (in particular
secular-liberal parties) had the strongest effects during the period studied. By contrast, a
presence of leftist parties in government has been largely associated with a defense of the
status quo. Still, in the Appendix we report results using the left share of total cabinet
posts, which point in the same direction as our main results but are, as suggested,
somewhat weaker.
Third, we need information about the systemic salience of welfare state issues in
election campaigns. This poses a challenge as research on agenda-setting has not
left many large-N comparative data sets behind. Those that do contain information
on salience and agenda-setting tend to tap phases in the policy process that
come either well before or well after elections. A prominent example of the
former type is the ‘Comparative Manifesto Project’ (see Budge et al., 2001),
focusing on the menu of issues that individual parties bring to elections. An
example of the latter is the ‘Comparative Policy Agendas’ project (Baumgartner
et al., 2011), which concentrates on elite actors in later and less public stages
of policymaking. While useful in their own right, these sources contain little
information about which issues actually dominate the public sphere during election
campaigns.
To get at such information we coded the contents of ‘election reports’ published in
the two political science journals, West European Politics (WEP) and Electoral
Studies (EL). Over the years, these reports have been written by country experts
observing speciﬁc elections closely, and later summarizing and interpreting events,
issues, and results for an academic audience in a few pages. At heart, they provide a
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‘thick’ qualitative documentation of historical events. Interestingly, however, studies
indicate that key aspects of the contents can be fruitfully quantiﬁed across time and
space. Kumlin and Esaiasson (2012) measure the incidence of election scandals and
ﬁnd that these have become more common, but less consequential for democratic
dissatisfaction. Armingeon and Giger (2008b) use the source to measure campaign
saliency of large cuts in welfare state generosity. Saliency boosts the negative impact of
actual cuts on electoral support for the government. Their coding, however, was
restricted to the rather unusual elections preceded by large cuts. Encouraged by these
efforts, we have taken a broader approach and codedwhetherwelfare state issues were
salient in all reported elections in West European countries, beginning in 1977
(WEP) and 1981 (EL), respectively.
Conceptually, we build on Green-Pedersen and Mortensen’s (2010) discussion,
which distinguishes between, on the one hand, actor-speciﬁc priorities and, on the
other, the systemic/contextual distribution of attention that emerges in a setting
where actors interact. All involved actors are assumed to partly contribute to this
systemic agenda at the same time as no one can entirely control it. Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen apply this notion to the interaction between government and
opposition in parliamentary documents and debates.We apply it on a broader scale,
measuring systemic agendas in election campaigns.
Speciﬁcally, the concept of an election campaign theme guided the coding of the
material. The coding instructions deﬁned an overall theme as a topic that, according
to the expert, was particularly signiﬁcant and salient in the public sphere during the
election campaign. Such themes, moreover, can in principle concern past, present or
future policies and performance. But it can also concern political institutions and
processes, political actors such as parties and politicians, coalition formation, their
general governing ability, as well as political features of the public (such as growing
mistrust and non-participation).1
When coding such themes we used and adapted a scheme previously used to
categorize EuropeanMPs answers to an open-ended ‘most important problem’ question
(1996 European Representation Study; see Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). The
resulting scheme identiﬁes 12 broad policy domains, one of which is ‘the welfare state’.
This category registers references to public services, transfer systems, welfare state
related policy outcomes (i.e. ‘poverty’, ‘inequality’, etc.), and concepts (i.e. ‘social safety
net’, ‘social justice’, etc.). In the following analysis, the variableWelfare agenda takes the
value 1 if at least one of the country reports indicated that an aspect of the welfare state
1 Reliability tests have given clearly satisfactory results. First, an intra-coder test of the coding of themes
was conducted 6–12 months after the ﬁrst coding. This involved the same person recoding a randomly
sampled 15% subset of elections. Overall, 91% of the total number of coded themes were coded to the same
policy domain in a consistent way across occasions and journals (WEP = 88%; EL = 94%). Intercoder
reliability tests of policy domains were performed in a similar fashion, recoding another randomly chosen
15% of the material. Again, consistency was also clearly satisfactory, albeit predictably slightly lower than
in the intracoder test. Here, overall domain consistency of coded themes was 82% (WEP = 84%;
EL = 79%).
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was highly salient in the last election, 0 otherwise.2 The dummy measure obviously
registers the salience of a very broad domain rather than a precise policy area. This
relative imprecision is necessary as country experts vary greatly in the terminology and
level of abstraction when discussing campaigns. Some speak in terms of detailed policy
areas and others in terms of more encompassing and vague concepts. However, we
argue that the broaderwelfare state domain is still of great interest here because the other
central concepts in government partisanship research are also very broad.
Finally, our control variables are meant to represent a ‘standard’ model of welfare
state policy. Here, we have been inspired by proliﬁc large-N studies of government
partisanship, including Korpi and Palme (2003), Allan and Scruggs (2004), as well as
other more recent studies (Rothstein et al., 2012). Included are trade openness [exports
and imports as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)] fromHeston et al. (2011), and
ﬁnancial openness (a measure of capital account openness where a higher score implies
more openness) from Brady et al. (2014), originally from Chinn and Ito (2008), as
measures of economic globalization. To control for business cycles, we include growth
in GDP per capita in constant prices from Heston et al. (2011), the percentage
unemployed (Armingeon et al., 2008), and the government budget deﬁcit as a share of
GDP (IMF, 2007).We also control for corporatist wage bargaining (Brady et al., 2014),
and an additive executive veto power index tapping federalism, presidentialism,
bicameralism, and frequent use of referenda (Brady et al., 2014). These two variables
are included since they may decrease the probabilities of retrenchment or expansion.
The data on trade openness, economic growth, unemployment, and budget deﬁcit
were taken from the secondary source provided by the QoG Social Policy Dataset
(Svensson et al., 2012).3
Overall, we have valid information for 16 West European countries on
generosity, government partisanship, campaign salience, and the control variables
from 1980 up to 2008 (29 years). For 38 country/years generosity was missing, in
which case we interpolated missing data (results based on only original data are
very similar). In total we have 416 year/country observations. The countries inclu-
ded are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
2 Reports were ﬁrst checked for passages where substantive issues and conﬂicts were discussed. Two
rules of thumbwere then used to determine which issues qualiﬁed as overall ‘contextual/systemic’ campaign
themes. First, we looked for instances where the expert author explicitly states that a topic has been
important for the election or public campaign in some overall sense, has created visible conﬂict or agreement
across parties or aroused signiﬁcant overall attention in the media or among the entire electorate. Thus,
simply the fact that an issue appears in the manifesto or on the agenda of a single party, special interest or
voter group is not, on its own, enough to qualify a topic as an election theme. Second, we also looked for
instances where an expert does not simply mention or list a topic, but devote considerable space to
explaining its contents and political.
3 We also ran models including a measure of ‘Quality of Government’ as a control variable. Following
Rothstein et al. (2012) we included a measure from the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) indi-
cators. Since the available measures do not cover the whole period that we analyze (data are not available
from before 1984), and since ﬁndings are virtually identical when including this variable, we report results
excluding it (results avaliable upon request).
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Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The generosity variable varies
theoretically from 0 to 64, and empirically between 24 and 47 in our sample. The
generosity variation between countries is clearly larger than the variation within
countries. We also see that the average cabinet right share has been 31%, and that
this has varied more within countries than between countries. The welfare state has
been on the agenda in 37% of all country/year observations (i.e. meaning it was
salient in the most recent campaign), and also here we see that there is considerable
variation both between and within countries.
Speciﬁcation, estimation, and results
As a point of departure we use the following empirical speciﬁcation:
Generosityi;t ¼ α0 + β0Right sharei;t1 + β1Welfare agendai;t1
+ β2Right sharei;t1 ´Welfare agendai;t1 + β3Xi;t1 + ci + ei;t;
where Generosityi,t is the welfare beneﬁt generosity in country i, year t, our main
independent variables are Right sharei,t−1 (right party cabinet portfolios as a
percentage of total cabinet posts), Welfare agendai,t−1 (stating if the welfare state was
on the agenda in the recent election) and an interaction between these variables.Xi,t−1
is a vector of control variables (described above), ci is an unobserved time invariant
disturbance term (e.g. unobserved factors that may be important for welfare beneﬁt
generosity), and ei,t is an unobserved time variant random disturbance term. In this
empirical model we implicitly restrict our independent variables to only have an effect
on beneﬁt generositywith a 1-year lag. This is a rather restrictive assumption butwe see
a point inmimicking the statisticalmodels ofmuch past researchwhile introducing new
independent variables (c.f. Allan and Scruggs, 2004).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Overall std.
dev.
Between std.
dev.
Within std.
dev.
Generosity 34.487 24.143 46.638 5.421 5.133 1.880
Right share 31.210 0 100 35.093 19.600 29.261
Welfare agenda 0.368 0 1 0.483 0.251 0.424
Trade openness 66.448 21.285 163.488 30.567 25.276 17.925
Financial openness 1.718 −1.159 2.456 1.072 0.596 0.908
Veto points 1.000 0 6 1.418 1.677 0.244
Gross domestic product
growth
2.057 −7.451 9.815 2.055 0.524 1.990
Budget deﬁcit −2.195 −14.784 18.768 4.722 3.276 3.403
Unemployment 7.972 1.617 24.171 4.109 3.272 2.682
Corporatism 3.310 1 5 1.161 0.992 0.615
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Table 3 displays initial results, with all years pooled, not taking over-time
hypotheses into account. A series of tests were performed to arrive at a
better understanding of these models. A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis
that all year coefﬁcients are jointly equal to zero, therefore year effects are included.
A Hausman test suggests that ﬁxed effects should be included in our models.
We also conducted two tests of cross-sectional dependence. Frees’ test rejects
the null of no cross-sectional dependence, while the Pesaran and Friedman
tests do not. Even though the tests point in different directions we take the
conservative stance and correct the standard errors for possible cross-sectional
dependence using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). A modiﬁed Wald
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity rejects the null of no heteroskedasticity,
indicating that robust standard errors should be used. Following these tests
we estimate a model using year- and country-ﬁxed effects and PCSE. AWooldridge
test of no ﬁrst order autocorrelation is rejected. Following Beck and Katz (1995)
we therefore include a lagged dependent variable to control for ﬁrst
order autocorrelation. An LM-test suggests that we still have problems with
autocorrelation.
In model 1 we use a ﬁrst differenced dependent variable, include a lagged
dependent variable, year- and country-ﬁxed effects, as well as PCSE, but an LM-test
again suggests we have not solved the problem of autocorrelation. As suggested by
Achen (2000), a lagged dependent variable may be problematic, thus model 2 is
Table 3. Determinants of welfare generosity in 16 Western European countries,
1980–2008
Model 1
(ΔGenerosity)
Model 2
(Generosityt)
Model 3
(Generosityt)
Generosityt− 1 −0.098 (0.022)***
Right sharet − 1 −0.000 (0.001) −0.003 (0.002)* 0.004 (0.005)
Welfare agendat− 1 0.438 (0.091)*** 0.290 (0.116)** 0.715 (0.407)*
Right sharet − 1×welfare agendat− 1 −0.004 (0.002)** −0.004 (0.002)* −0.008 (0.006)
Trade opennesst −1 0.006 (0.004)* 0.023 (0.012)* 0.055 (0.010)***
Financial opennesst− 1 0.163 (0.053)*** 0.473 (0.139)*** 1.289 (0.289)***
Veto pointst −1 −0.074 (0.072) −0.038 (0.132) −0.072 (0.393)
Gross domestic product growtht− 1 0.039 (0.018)** −0.014 (0.022) −0.045 (0.097)
Budget deﬁcitt− 1 −0.008 (0.014) −0.041 (0.022)* −0.130 (0.075)
Unemploymentt −1 −0.060 (0.015)*** −0.083 (0.034)** −0.275 (0.100)**
Corporatismt− 1 0.041 (0.051) 0.021 (0.061) −0.376 (0.211)*
R2 0.987 0.976 0.299
Observations 401 407 407
In all, 16 countries were included in all models. Year ﬁxed effects and country ﬁxed effects are
included in all models. Model 1 is estimated using panel corrected standard errors, a differenced
dependent variable, and a lag of the dependent variable. Model 2 is estimated using panel
corrected standard errors and a Prais–Winsten correction for panel speciﬁc AR(1) serial cor-
relation. Model 3 is estimated using Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
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estimated using PCSE and a Prais–Winsten correction for panel speciﬁc AR(1) serial
correlation to account for the autocorrelation. Estimating a third model with
Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, we control for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation,
and correlation between panels, which makes this our preferred model.
We conducted several tests of ‘stationarity’ to ﬁnd out if the generosity index is
trending during the investigated time period. These point in different directions.
Previous studies in this ﬁeld have tried to solve the problem of potential non-
stationarity in different ways. Huber and Stephens (2001) include a time trend and
in some estimations a lagged dependent variable, and we have already used these
remedies. However, some previous studies (e.g. Allan and Scruggs, 2004) estimate
ﬁrst differences of the dependent variable, as we do in model 1. Comparing the
results from our models they seem broadly robust to all these manipulations.
What are the main substantive ﬁndings from the pooled analyses in Table 3?4
We start with the coefﬁcient for ‘right share’, which estimates the impact of
government partisanship in years subsequent to campaigns in which the welfare
state was not systemically salient. One sees that this impact is, in most speciﬁcations,
insigniﬁcant or very weak. Thus, in the absence of campaign salience, and over the
whole span of this period in Western Europe, there has not been any clear or
consistent relationship between government partisanship and welfare generosity.
In fact, consistent with our overall argument, other coefﬁcients reveal that such
salience matters in several ways. For example, we see a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for ‘welfare agenda’. This tells us that systemic campaign
saliency is associated with policy changes towards a more generous welfare state.
Importantly, this estimate concerns situations when no rightist parties are repre-
sented in the government (i.e. when right share is zero). Expressed differently, it is
the combination of systemic salience and an entirely leftist government that
increases welfare generosity. Continuing this interactive reasoning, we see margin-
ally signiﬁcant interactions between welfare agenda and cabinet share in most
speciﬁcations, indicating that right share makes a larger difference when the welfare
state has been on the campaign agenda.
Figure 1 visualizes the results using the preferred speciﬁcation (model 3). The
y-axis refers to the marginal effect of systemic salience on welfare generosity, while
the x-axis refers to the share of rightist cabinet posts. The dotted lines indicate 90%
conﬁdence intervals. Here we see with greater clarity how the salience-leftist
government combination increases welfare generosity. The magnitudes imply that
in a year where the welfare state has been on the agenda in the last election, and
where there are no rightist ministers in the cabinet, welfare generosity increases by
4 A note should be made on the reportedR2 statistics in Table 2. The relatively low reportedR2 statistics
for model 4 is due to that we have a ﬁrst differenced dependent variable, and changes are generally harder to
predict. The relatively low R2 in model 6 is due to that the STATA-command only reports the within-R2 for
the xtscc-command that we use here, while the xtpcse-command used in the other estimations only report
the overall-R2.
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0.7 on a scale empirically ranging between 24 and 47. This is roughly 40% of the
within country standard deviation.
But we also see how sensitive the positive salience effect is. Campaigns cease to make
a signiﬁcant difference as soon as the proportion of right cabinet posts approaches
20%. And when cabinets instead contain only rightist parties the welfare state neither
expands nor shrinks signiﬁcantly. One can note here that the share of rightist parties in
the cabinet the years following a welfare election was zero in almost 40% of the cases,
and 100 in almost 10% of the cases. Thus, these predictions do concern rather
frequently occurring events. It should also be noted that shares of rightist parties in the
cabinet are largely the same also after welfare elections; thus, results are not somehow
driven by leftist parties winning more welfare elections than non-welfare elections.
In terms of our hypotheses, these initial pooled results suggest the original
‘politics matters’ is too simple, at least when looking at the entire period. Neither is
the equally general ‘salience breeds expansion’ well supported. Overall attention to
a problem has no general main effect that operates independently of who the
policymakers are, although the mostly non-signiﬁcant effects are always predicted
to be on the positive side. Instead, while politics certainly matters it seems to be the
combination of an almost exclusively leftist presence in government and big-time
election campaign attention to the welfare state that has bred welfare state
expansion. In sum, then, when pooling all these time points it is the ‘salience makes
politics matter’ hypothesis that receives the clearest support. This nicely illustrates
our broader point: elections do more than aggregate preferences in the shape of
government partisanship and by considering the focus of the campaign that framed
the election we arrive at sharper explanations of public policy.
Our empirical story does not end here, however. In fact, the theoretical framework
suggests it may be inappropriate to lump all these time points together. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 1 Marginal effect ofWelfare election on Generosity at different levels of rightist seats as
a share of cabinet seats.
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challenges coming from the NPWS framework suggest that the impact of various
political factors change as welfare states probe deeper into the ‘era of permanent’
austerity, beginning sometime in early 1980s. Now, the notion of such an era does not
mean that a simple dichotomous switch goes on around 1980. In reality, welfare states
have gradually become more pressured by complex and evolving processes such as
population ageing, post-industrialization of labour markets, globalization,
immigration, European integration, and so on. We are now interested in whether the
impact of political factors have changed aswelfare states have ploughed deeper into this
more hostile environment, widely assumed to have begun in the early 1980s.
For this purpose, we now analyze patterns in an early and a late time period,
respectively, splitting the data in two equally large time periods with the mid-1990s
as a cutoff-point. For the most part, this is a convenience division that allows us to
test our hypothesis while still retaining enough data in each category. But it should
also be said that scholars identify the period beginning in the late 1990s as
particularly intensive when it comes to debate about, and policy responses to,
reform pressures (Hemerijck, 2013).
In Table 4, model 1, we ﬁrst reproduce key coefﬁcients from the pooled analysis
(Table 3, model 3). Model 2 then has the corresponding speciﬁcation but for the
years 1980–94. Here, we see the same tendencies as in the pooled analysis,
only even more clear-cut and signiﬁcant: this includes a non-signiﬁcant partisan
coefﬁcient in the absence of campaign salience, a positive effect of salience when no
rightist parties are in government, and ﬁnally an interaction (now with a signiﬁcant
interaction term) such that government partisanship effects grow to signiﬁcance
when the last campaign attended systemically to welfare state issues. These patterns,
graphed in Figure 2, refute any general ‘salience breeds expansion’ prediction for
the early period. Rather, there is clear support for ‘salience makes politics
matter’, with expansive effects for leftist governments and an almost signiﬁcant
retrenchment effect of salience combined with a rightist government.
Results change in the late period (model 3). The one stable observation is the still
non-signiﬁcant impact of partisanship in the absence of salience. But the salience
coefﬁcient itself has now gone from positive in the early period to negative. Thus,
whereas the combination of campaign attention and leftist government used to
generate greater generosity, it now results in retrenchment. In fact, as Figure 3 illus-
trates, this negative salience effect is estimated formost types of governments in the late
period. This ﬂies in the face of the blame avoidance inspired ‘salience stalls
retrenchment’ hypothesis. In the late period, apparently, retrenchment becomes more
likely, not less, when election campaigns attend to welfare state issues in a major way.
In the late period, ﬁnally, campaign salience ceases to make government
partisanship matter, at least in the way it used to. In fact, not only does the previous
interaction disappear, as the ‘salience ends ideology’ hypothesis forecasts. It even
seems as if ‘salience makes Nixon go to China’: retrenchment effects in times of
campaign salience are actually slightly stronger among leftist governments and
these become non-signiﬁcant once right share exceeds 80%.Now, it needs to be said
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that this is a rather mild tendency. The overall interaction coefﬁcient is not
statistically signiﬁcant and the model predicts some signiﬁcant or non-signiﬁcant
retrenchment as a result of campaign attention almost regardless of who wins the
election. Thus, the main conclusion for the later period might be best stated as
follows: major salience of welfare state issues in European election campaigns now
results in some retrenchment (almost) regardless of who forms the postelection
government.
Conclusions: future research and democratic concerns
Likemany before us, we can conclude that electoral-political factors matter towelfare
state policy. At the same time, we have suggested a broader andmore contingent view
Table 4. Determinants of welfare generosity in 16 Western European countries,
1980–2008
Model 1
(1980–2008)
Model 2
(1980–94)
Model 3
(1995–2008)
Right sharet−1 0.004 (0.005) −0.001 (0.002) −0.003 (0.005)
Welfare agendat− 1 0.715 (0.407)* 0.755 (0.229)*** −0.591 (0.258)**
Right sharet − 1×welfare agendat− 1 −0.008 (0.006) −0.012 (0.002)*** 0.004 (0.005)
R2 0.299 0.279 0.333
Observations 407 186 221
Year ﬁxed effects and country ﬁxed effects are included in all models. Control variables are trade
openness, ﬁnancial openness, veto points, gross domestic product growth, budget deﬁcit,
unemployment, and corporatism. All models are estimated using Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Figure 2 Marginal effect ofWelfare election on Generosity at different levels of rightist seats as
a share of cabinet seats (1980–1994).
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where democratic elections not only translate preferences into policy, but also involve
a discursive phase shaping democratic input. While much research emphasizes policy
preferences (i.e. government partisanship), and pay less attention to policy agendas,
our theory and results suggest policy is driven by both in combination.
The precise nature of campaigns effects, however, appears to have changed.
During the ﬁrst half of the examined period (the 1980s and early 1990s) campaigns
facilitated government partisanship effects on welfare generosity. This is what one
would expect in a well-functioning democracy, where campaign attention installs
stronger ‘mandate-conﬁdence’ in victorious policymakers, and increase their fear of
being held to account if mandates are not realized. The ﬁnding is also interesting
given the instability in partisanship effects in European research. This instability
may have been due not only to limited variation in independent variables (Schmidt,
2010), but also to omitted moderating campaign effects.
More recently, campaigns cease to facilitate partisanship effects. This is
consistent with NPWS, at least in the sense that this theory predicts convergence
around a cautious retrenchment agenda in the ‘era of permanent austerity’.
Likewise, it is consistent with recent reports of declining partisanship effects for a
host of welfare state policy outcomes (Stephens, 2015). More than this, however,
we even ﬁnd a mild ‘Nixon goes to China’ (Ross, 2000a) pattern, that is somewhat
more retrenchment by leftist governments when welfare issues have been salient.
This is especially striking as research suggests leftist parties may be punished harder
for retrenchment (Vis, 2015). So there may be a mismatch between elite perceptions
and actual mass reactions to welfare reform (Wenzelburger, 2014). For the
European left, it is cause for concern that leftist governments now introduce
somewhat more retrenchment when the welfare state has been widely salient, at the
same time as these suffer more electorally from such policy change.
Figure 3 Marginal effect ofWelfare election on Generosity at different levels of rightist seats as
a share of cabinet seats (1995–2008).
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Again, we stress that the Nixon pattern is quite weak, with predicted
non-retrenchment in times of salience only for very rightist governments. Thus,
themain takeaway for the later periodmight just as well be expressed like this: salience
of welfare state issues in European election campaigns now results in some retrench-
ment (almost) regardless of who forms the postelection government. How can one
explain this ﬁnding? After all, while centrist convergence around retrenchment is
expected by NPWS, this theory hardly anticipates more retrenchment when welfare
issues are salient. At any rate, the ﬁnding is the opposite of the NPWS-inspired ‘
salience stalls retrenchment’ hypothesis, which assumes policymakers retrench more
when blame can be avoided (Pierson, 1996; Balla et al., 2002), and that blame
avoidance is – all things equal – easier when campaigns focus on other topics.
One might perhaps rescue a NPWS interpretation by assuming that while salience
makes blame avoidance harder, it might also intensify – and improve – blame
avoidance strategizing. This could be true for ‘presentational’ strategies, such as arguing
that ‘there is no choice’, as well for ‘institutional’ and ‘policy-related’ ones.While such a
move is theoretically possible, we do not think it entirely accounts for the retrenchment
effect of campaign salience. While blame avoidance strategizing is surely abundant
(e.g. Hood, 2007; Lindbom, 2007; Vis, 2015), there are also signs of their mirror
image, that is ‘credit claiming’ strategies for welfare reform. Surveying the debate
stimulated by NPWS, Levy (2010: 561, 564) notes that ‘Pierson paints an unﬂattering
picture of the politics of retrenchment, with governments manipulating and misleading
the public in order to enact reforms that lack popular support’. Levy argues that
reforms have not only been larger than predicted by NPWS but also materialized via a
more communicative and democratically appealing route. Indeed, ‘[R]etrenchment is
not always unsavory and conspirational. Governments can also enact spending cuts by
taking their case to the public, hitching retrenchment to higher objectives, negotiating
with the social partners, and addressing concerns about fairness’. Thus, several
scholars report striking examples of governments taking clear public credit for
welfare restructuring, including retrenchment on a large scale (Bonoli, 2012;
Elmelund-Præstekær and Emmenegger, 2013). Others report that the electoral
punishment ‘fear factor’ postulated by Pierson is exaggerated (Giger, 2011; Giger and
Nelson, 2011), or that electoral vulnerability can in some contexts produce more
retrenchment, not less (Immergut and Abou-Chadi, 2014). All these observations
suggest, at the very least, something more than pure blame avoidance accounts for
retrenchment campaign effects in the late period.
But what, exactly? Future research would do well to unpack the campaign
contexts registered here as ‘welfare state elections’. We think the concepts of ‘blame
avoidance’ and ‘credit claiming’ can be exploited to characterize systemic campaign
contexts in a more nuanced way. Beginning with pure blame avoidance, one
ideal-typical context may be called ‘collective vagueness’, where all or most of the
major contending parties talk loudly but vaguely about welfare policies and future
challenges, keeping their retrenchment cards pressed against their chests. A second,
blame avoidance dominated, situation occurs when actors clearly signal that
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retrenchment is to be expected but blame an external force (i.e. a crisis, the EU,
capital ﬂight, demographic change). They emphasize that they have no choice but to
do what we would rather not. We can refer to this as a ‘collective blame
shift’ context.
The third and fourth ideal types introduce credit claiming. Under ‘collective credit
claiming’ all or most major actors put retrenchment plans openly on the table,
presenting at least partly positive arguments for it. These can range from ideological
beliefs about fairness to the attitude that we should choose what is painful now
because, although it could be postponed, it is sensible in the long run. Fourth, under
‘conﬂictual credit claiming’ only some of the major parties in the debate take the
credit claiming route, whereas others actively defend the status quo, keep quiet
about retrenchment plans, or play the ‘no choice’ card, or some combination
of these.
This last possibility seems like the most democratically appealing one. Here,
citizens get not only a welfare state debate, but also a range of arguments and
alternatives. Still, democratic concerns arise when we confront this vision with
our ﬁnding that citizens get some retrenchment as a result of welfare salience almost
regardless of who forms the government. For sure, the other scenarios also lead to
democratic concerns, one way or another. ‘Collective vagueness’ implies a nasty
post-election surprise for citizens. ‘Collective blame shift’ and ‘collective credit
claiming’ take the dishonesty and surprise out of the equation, but still leave voters
with little choice in a salient policy domain.
Overall, democratic concerns arise almost regardless of whether we turn to blame
avoidance theories or credit claiming to explain retrenchment effects of welfare
state salience. Future research, however, should tell us more about which of these
situations are more frequently at hand and which affect policy the most. As
concluded in a recent overview (Kumlin and Haugsgjerd, 2015), welfare
retrenchment, welfare performance dissatisfaction, and inequality only rarely spark
electoral accountability. However, they rather consistently breed generalized
democratic dissatisfaction and distrust. More knowledge about election campaign
contexts may help explain why citizens are currently reacting negatively to the
political systems that produce these policies and outcomes.
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Appendix
Table A1. Replication of Table 2 using Left share instead of Right share
Model 4
(ΔGenerosityt)
Model 5
(Generosityt)
Model 6
(Generosityt)
Generosityt−1 −0.100 (0.022)***
Left sharet − 1 −0.002 (0.001)* 0.001 (0.002) −0.004 (0.005)
Welfare agendat− 1 0.155 (0.086)* 0.173 (0.117) 0.225 (0.405)
Left sharet − 1×welfare agendat− 1 0.004 (0.002)** 0.001 (0.002) 0.006 (0.006)
Trade opennesst −1 0.004 (0.003) 0.0212 (0.012)* 0.054 (0.010)***
Financial opennesst− 1 0.153 (0.053)*** 0.457 (0.137)*** 1.285 (0.316)***
Veto pointst −1 −0.062 (0.070) −0.041 (0.127) −0.037 (0.384)
Gross domestic product growtht− 1 0.042 (0.019)** −0.009 (0.022) −0.043 (0.097)
Budget deﬁcitt− 1 −0.009 (0.014) −0.043 (0.022)** −0.131 (0.078)
Unemploymentt −1 −0.064 (0.014)*** −0.087 (0.034)*** −0.277 (0.099)**
Corporatismt− 1 0.045 (0.050) 0.032 (0.062) −0.361 (0.214)
R2 0.245 0.974 0.298
Observations 401 407 407
In all, 16 countries were included in all models. Year ﬁxed effects and country ﬁxed effects are
included in all models. Model 1 is estimated using panel corrected standard errors, a differenced
dependent variable, and a lag of the dependent variable. Model 2 is estimated using panel
corrected standard errors and a Prais–Winsten correction for panel speciﬁc AR(1) serial
correlation. Model 3 is estimated using Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
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